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Bargaining is ubiquitous in our professional 
and private lives. Not surprisingly, bargaining 
has received considerable research attention. 
Because real-world settings generally entail a 
lack of control, most empirical insights derive 
from laboratory experiments. The external 
validity of laboratory findings is, however, still 
an open question (Levitt and List 2007; Camerer 
2015; Baltussen, van den Assem, and van Dolder 
2015). Two of the grounds for concern are the 
frequent use of student subjects and the small 
or hypothetical stakes. In the present study, we 
use data from the British TV show Divided. This 
game show combines high stakes and a diverse 
subject pool within a controlled setting.
We find that individual behavior and outcomes 
are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those 
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who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger 
shares, are less likely to make concessions, and 
take home larger amounts. Threatening to play 
hardball is ineffective: although contestants 
who announce that they will not back down do 
well relative to others, they do not secure larger 
absolute amounts and they harm others. There 
is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and 
little evidence that demographic characteristics 
matter.
I. Game Show and Data
Divided was developed by the Dutch media 
firm Talpa, and produced for the ITV network in 
the United Kingdom by Endemol UK. The show 
debuted on TV in May 2009 and ran until May 
2010. A total of 53 episodes were aired.
Each game is played with three contestants 
who are strangers to each other. There are two 
stages: one in which the contestants team up 
to accumulate a communal jackpot through 
answering quiz questions, and one in which they 
have to divide this jackpot between them.
The first stage lasts for a maximum of five 
rounds. Round 1 has five questions that are 
worth up to £3,000 each. In the subsequent four 
rounds the number of questions and the maxi-
mum value per question are 4, 3, 2, and 1, and 
£7,500, £15,000, £30,000, and £75,000, respec-
tively. How much a question actually contributes 
to the jackpot depends on the team’s speed of 
answering. Incorrect answers halve the jackpot 
and after three mistakes the team is out of the 
game. At the end of each round, the team can 
decide to stop and divide the jackpot, but only 
if they make that decision unanimously. The 
online Appendix includes a schematic overview 
of this first stage.
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The second stage comprises the bargaining 
element that is central to our analysis. The jack-
pot is split into three unequal shares. The largest 
is marked A, the middle B, and the smallest C. 
The players unanimously have to decide who 
gets which. First, they each receive 15 seconds 
to make their case and stake their claim to one 
of the shares. The order in which they are asked 
to do so is determined by their positions on the 
stage, starting from the viewers’ left. If they do 
not agree immediately, they have 100 seconds to 
reach consensus in a free-form discussion. With 
each second that passes they lose one percentage 
point of the initial jackpot, and after 100 seconds 
there is nothing left. After 50 seconds there is 
a time-out. In this brief pause, the contestants 
keep silent and the game show host summa-
rizes the situation by emphasizing how much 
has been lost and what is left, or by enumer-
ating the remaining values of the three shares. 
The second stage can thus be seen as a natural 
bargaining experiment where “subjects” have to 
unanimously decide on the allocation of indivis-
ible shares, in a format that allows  face-to-face 
communication and incorporates (close to) con-
tinuous costs to bargaining.
For each episode we collected data on the 
relevant observables, including demographic 
characteristics of the contestants, the results for 
each quiz question and the individual contribu-
tions to the answers, contestants’ claims and 
how these changed during the bargaining phase, 
whether and when agreement was reached, and 
the individual payoffs. Combined, the 53 epi-
sodes comprise the games of 56 teams, with 
some starting in one episode and continuing in 
the next. Because 13 teams leave the show early 
after three incorrect answers, 43 are used in our 
analyses.
Men and women each represent half of the 
contestant pool. The average contestant is 36 
years of age, the youngest 18, and the oldest 70. 
The average final jackpot is £33,512, the small-
est £7,282, and the largest £115,755. These are 
considerable sums relative to the amounts typ-
ically used in laboratory experiments and also 
many times the median gross weekly earnings 
of £404 in the UK in April 2010 (Statistical 
Bulletin Office for National Statistics 2010).
Two-thirds of the time the three shares in the 
jackpot represent close to 60, 30, and 10 percent. 
Only two other subdivisions occur: 70/20/10 
and 65/25/10, both in 16 percent of the cases. 
Most contestants initially claim the largest share: 
79 percent opt for A, 16 percent pick B, and 5 
percent content themselves with C straight away. 
Only 9 percent of the teams agree immediately, 
72 percent do so while the timer counts down, 
and 19 percent fail to reach agreement and go 
home empty-handed. The efficiency rate, or the 
average fraction of the jackpot that is actually 
awarded, is approximately 50 percent. The aver-
age outcome per contestant is £5,633. Would we 
have run this show as an experiment ourselves, 
the total costs in subject payoffs alone would 
have been £726,706. The online Appendix dis-
plays the distribution of the bargaining duration 
and provides more detailed descriptive statistics.
II. Analyses and Findings
Table 1 summarizes our regression analyses. 
Model 1 is an ordered probit model that explains 
a contestant’s decision to initially claim share 
A (3), B (2), or C (1). Model 2 is a probit model 
for the likelihood that a contestant makes a hard-
ball announcement at the start of the bargaining 
stage by stating not to back down from her ini-
tial claim. This model is estimated for the sub-
set of contestants who initially claimed share A (only one contestant who claimed share B made 
a hardball announcement). When there is no 
immediate agreement, some will have to make 
concessions to bring agreement within reach. 
Model 3 is a probit model for the likelihood that 
a contestant lowers her claim. This model is esti-
mated for those who initially claimed share A 
or B in situations with no immediate agreement.
A contestant’s bargaining outcome can be 
defined relative to others and relative to the initial 
size of the jackpot. Model 4 considers the pay-
offs relative to others. This ordered probit model 
explains the share A (3), B (2), or C (1) that a 
contestant ends up with. Contestants who fail 
to reach agreement and go home  empty-handed 
are excluded. By solely looking at the share a 
contestant receives, this model ignores the effi-
ciency of the bargaining process. Model 5 there-
fore analyzes the money that players take home 
as a fraction of the initial jackpot. Additional 
results are in the online Appendix.
A. Demographic Characteristics
Psychologists have devoted considerable 
attention to individual differences in  negotiation, 
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especially during the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
The general picture regarding demographic 
and personality characteristics is one of contra-
dictory findings, frequent null results, and low 
explanatory power (Rubin and Brown 1975; 
Thompson 1990). For gender, meta-analyses 
indicate that males are more competitive and 
better in acquiring favorable outcomes, but the 
differences are slim and sensitive to the exper-
imental conditions (Walters, Stuhlmacher, and 
Meyer 1998; Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999).
The demographic variables that we study 
are gender, age, and education. Contestants 
normally mention their age when they intro-
duce themselves, but not their education. We 
have therefore estimated their education on the 
basis of occupation and other information they 
provide. We distinguish between contestants 
with and without a bachelor (or higher) degree. 
Those who are currently enrolled in higher edu-
cation and those whose job title suggests work 
experience equivalent to the bachelor level or 
higher are also included in the higher education 
category.
In line with the general picture from earlier 
studies, we find little evidence that behavior and 
Table 1—Regression Results
Initial  
claim
Hardball 
announcement Concession
Share  
won
Prize won/ 
initial jackpot
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age −0.013 −0.007 −0.007 −0.010 −0.003**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001)
Gender (male = 1) −0.230 −0.123 −0.096 0.066 −0.017
(0.290) (0.314) (0.263) (0.205) (0.028)
Education (high = 1) −0.008 0.033 −0.057 −0.003 −0.017
(0.333) (0.329) (0.303) (0.212) (0.035)
First mover (first = 1) 0.007 −0.121 0.300 −0.181 −0.009
(0.288) (0.279) (0.327) (0.337) (0.035)
Stakes second quartile 0.288 0.934** −0.532** −0.089*
(0.438) (0.464) (0.248) (0.045)
Stakes third quartile 0.090 0.746 −0.545** −0.083*
(0.355) (0.461) (0.231) (0.043)
Stakes fourth quartile −0.208 1.009** −0.156 0.019
(0.355) (0.438) (0.239) (0.045)
Variance shares 11.742 31.002** −9.183 −4.002**
(12.180) (14.469) (10.580) (1.500)
Contribution correct 4.133*** −0.533 0.085 2.969** 0.437***
(1.436) (1.841) (1.722) (1.424) (0.153)
Contribution incorrect −0.660 −0.005 1.801** −1.260** −0.114*
(0.522) (0.671) (0.854) (0.640) (0.066)
Constant −2.293** 0.330 0.397***
(1.167) (0.942) (0.097)
Cut point 1 −0.680 −0.285
(0.953) (0.616)
Cut point 2 0.288 0.642
(0.950) (0.618)
log-likelihood −73.71 −53.79 −74.24 −109.52
R2 0.084 0.103 0.069 0.051 0.186
Observations 129 102 115 105 129
Clusters 43 43 39 35 43
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the team level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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outcomes are related to demographic character-
istics. Gender, age, and education are insignifi-
cant determinants of contestants’ initial claims, 
their hardball announcements and concessions, 
and the shares they end up with. The sole signif-
icant result is that younger contestants secure a 
larger part of the initial size of the pie.
B. Contributions
Entitlements are subjectively-held fairness 
judgments that people perceive as rights they 
wish to defend, and can arise from history, cus-
tom, the status quo, or contributions (Schlicht 
1998). Gächter and Riedl (2005) experimentally 
show that entitlements influence bargaining 
behavior and outcomes.
In Divided, the only and apparent source of 
entitlements are contestants’ individual contri-
butions to the communal jackpot. Theoretical 
and empirical work on equity theory suggests 
that contestants will care about the proportion-
ality of outcomes and inputs, and deem it fair 
if those who contributed more to the jackpot 
receive a larger share (Adams 1965; Konow 
2003).
To quantify contributions, we estimate both 
the positive and negative contributions made by 
each player. Specifically, if the group gave a cor-
rect answer, we divide the credit for the answer 
equally over all contestants who argued in favor 
of it; those who did not argue for any particular 
answer, argued for a wrong one, or argued for 
multiple answers (including or not including the 
correct one) receive no share of the credit.1 If 
the group gave an incorrect answer, the credit is 
divided equally over those who argued in favor 
of one of the incorrect answers; those who did 
not argue for any particular answer or argued for 
the correct one only are not assigned any credit.
We compute both a composite measure that 
combines the credits for correct and incorrect 
answers into one metric, and measures that 
disaggregate the contributions to correct and 
1 There are three exceptions to this rule: (i) if all con-
testants argued both for and against the correct answer but 
managed to come to the correct answer together, they are 
each assigned one-third of the credit; (ii) if two contestants 
argued both for and against the correct answer and came to 
the correct answer together while the third remained silent, 
then these two share the credit; (iii) if contestants made a 
random guess and this guess turned out to be correct, then 
they share the credit. 
incorrect answers. The former is calculated by 
adding up the contestant’s credits for correct 
answers and subtracting her credits for incor-
rect answers. We standardize by dividing by the 
total number of correct answers minus the total 
number of incorrect answers of the team. The 
measure for correct (incorrect) answers is cal-
culated by adding up all credits of the contestant 
for questions answered correctly (incorrectly), 
and standardizing by the total number of correct (incorrect) answers.
We find that equity concerns play an import-
ant role in the bargaining process. Contestants 
who contributed more to the communal jackpot 
claim a larger share and end up with a larger 
prize. (Detailed regression results for the com-
posite measure are in the online Appendix.) 
There are different effects for positive and neg-
ative contributions: positive contributions drive 
contestants’ opening claims, while negative 
contributions determine whether a contestant 
makes concessions during the bargaining pro-
cess. Consequently, both  positive and negative 
contributions determine the final outcomes.
One explanation for this asymmetry is that 
those with negative contributions initially con-
sider such contributions to be innocent mistakes 
for which they should not be held accountable, 
but subsequent communication promotes a more 
objective, less self-serving view (Loewenstein 
et al. 1993). The asymmetric effect is also in line 
with query theory (Johnson, Häubl, and Keinan 
2007): contestants’ initial focus on positive con-
tributions occurs when the problem is framed in 
positive terms (“what share do you deserve?”), 
but switches to negative contributions when the 
framing becomes negative (“who should move 
their claim downward?”).
C. Situational Variables
The situational factors we consider are the 
order in which contestants make their initial 
claims, the stakes, and the differences between 
the percentage shares to be divided. To inves-
tigate whether there is a first-mover effect, we 
include a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if the contestant was the first to make her 
claim to one of the shares. For the role of stakes 
we use dummy variables representing the differ-
ent quartiles of the stake distribution. We use the 
variance across the percentage shares as a mea-
sure for the divergence between the prizes.
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There seems to be no first-mover advantage. 
Those who get to make their claim early do not 
behave differently and do not earn more. When 
the stakes are relatively low, contestants are less 
likely to announce a hardball strategy. The effect 
of the stakes on concessions is U-shaped: con-
cessions occur relatively often with low and high 
stakes, and less so in between. Correspondingly, 
contestants retain a larger share of the jackpot if 
the jackpot is at the low or high end of its range. 
Last, a greater variance of the percentage shares 
leads to more hardball announcements and less 
efficient bargaining.
D. Hardball
A considerable line of research focuses on 
commitment strategies in bargaining (e.g., 
Schelling 1956; Crawford 1982). In our bargain-
ing setting, contestants cannot formally commit 
themselves in the sense that they are always free 
to adjust their claim without incurring  monetary 
costs. However, contestants may attempt to 
convince others that they feel internally com-
mitted to a specific share by making hardball 
announcements.
Announcing a hardball strategy of not back-
ing down turns out to not be beneficial. (Detailed 
regression results are in the online Appendix.) 
Contestants who used this threat improve their 
relative standing within the group, but they do 
not manage to obtain larger amounts in an abso-
lute sense because they make it more difficult to 
reach an agreement. Their opponents are worse 
off, because contestants who make a hardball 
announcement also walk the walk: they are less 
likely to make a concession and thus frustrate 
the bargaining process.
III. Concluding Remarks
We have examined high stakes bargaining in 
the TV show Divided. One of the main findings 
is that entitlements derived from contributions 
are an important driving force behind behavior 
and outcomes. This refutes the commonly held 
belief that fairness concerns will be unimportant 
when monetary incentives are sufficiently large (Rabin 1993; Telser 1995; Levitt and List 2007). 
Another interesting result is the inefficacy of 
adopting a hardball strategy. Due to bargaining 
costs, the total pie in our game shrinks such that 
there is no advantage left for the threatening 
party and others are worse off. This result is in 
line with game-theoretic reasoning, as simple 
strategies that anyone can follow should not 
increase earnings.
One general comment on the game is that the 
key to maximizing the overall payoff to the team 
appears to depend on the willingness of one of 
the players to agree to accept the smallest prize. 
When no one is willing to concede that he or she 
contributed the least, deadlocks are common. 
We conjecture that if an objective tally of rela-
tive contributions had been made available to the 
players they would have found it easier to reach 
agreements.
Possible selection effects can be a reason 
for external validity concerns. Contestants 
 self-select into auditions, and are then selected 
by producers to play the game for real. It is 
unclear to what degree such processes may have 
influenced our findings. Selection procedures are 
of course not unique to game shows, and form 
an intrinsic part of almost any field or  laboratory 
setting. Yet, our sample varies widely in terms 
of background characteristics, seemingly form-
ing a cross section of middle-class society that 
is much closer to a cross section of the general 
population than the university students com-
monly employed in experimental work.
The game show setting can be another reason 
for concerns. While there is no live studio audi-
ence, contestants know that many people will 
observe their behavior on TV. This means that 
the bargaining game is not strictly one-shot, as 
contestants’ behavior and outcomes might affect 
their reputation. The specific setting might be 
viewed as providing an incentive to fight harder, 
as one may not want to appear weak on TV. 
However, being viewed as stubborn and respon-
sible for losing a large fraction of the jackpot is 
also an outcome to be avoided. Furthermore, the 
game show setting might trigger a desire to “win 
the contest” and go home with more money than 
fellow team members. Alternatively, contestants 
may believe that the game is won if they man-
age to come to a resolution with the people they 
teamed up with. Thus, although the game show 
setting might influence the behavior of the con-
testants, there is no a priori reason to believe that 
the environment encourages any particular type 
of behavior.
For these reasons, we do not consider these 
possible influences of the specific decision envi-
ronment to render our findings less interesting 
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or less predictive of behavior than other research 
settings. In laboratory and field situations there 
is always some degree of scrutiny, and each set-
ting will cause particular motives to be more 
prominent than others. It is infeasible to study 
behavior under each and every possible set of 
conditions. The optimal approach is therefore to 
focus on a limited number of diverging settings. 
The contribution of the present paper should be 
evaluated in this light. We have employed the 
unique features of a TV game show to study 
bargaining behavior outside the laboratory and 
for stakes that are impossible to replicate in 
experiments.
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